on the relationships between financing and output in the not-for-profit (NFP) hospital considers the extent of the influence that financing has on the character of the NFP organization and the extent to which the availability of particular types of financing affects outputs. We also investigate whether characteristics of hospital outputs can affect the availability of financing. Our motivation in presenting this article is our view that the capital formation and capital structure of the health care industry are important determinants of the cost, quality, types, and distribution of the services it provides. Further, government expenditures, taxation, and policies toward debt and equity markets can have a significant influence on capital financing and capital formation.
This review of the literature on the relationships between financing and output in the not-for-profit (NFP) hospital considers the extent of the influence that financing has on the character of the NFP organization and the extent to which the availability of particular types of financing affects outputs. We also investigate whether characteristics of hospital outputs can affect the availability of financing. Our motivation in presenting this article is our view that the capital formation and capital structure of the health care industry are important determinants of the cost, quality, types, and distribution of the services it provides. Further, government expenditures, taxation, and policies toward debt and equity markets can have a significant influence on capital financing and capital formation.
The importance of capital formation and financing is obvious. Cohodes (1983) has detailed the magnitude of the capital question. Over (Sloan and Vraciu 1983) . Others have argued that health care providers in general are no longer motivated by charity or a desire to be of service as much as they are driven by the same profit motive that defines any typical enterprise in our economy (Herzlinger and Krasker 1987 Since the focus here is on not-for-profit hospitals, analysis using the usual behavioral assumption of profit maximization may lead to erroneous results. Similarly, cost minimization, the profit-maximization corollary in competitive markets, may not be appropriate, because of both the not-for-profit nature of the hospital and the lack of competition in many hospital markets. The possible inadequacy of traditional profitmaximizing-cost-minimizing economic models in the case of the hospital industry has led to much speculation and research. An overview of the theories that do not involve financing issues is provided here. Subsequent sections introduce models that explicitly include various sources of financing, some of which are based on these more general models.
Among the many overviews of economic models of hospital behavior are those by Davis (1972) , Jacobs (1974) , and Joseph (1974) . Jacobs' review classifies models of hospitals into six types. The first two types of models treat the hospital as a quantity or quality maximizer. These models translate the objective function of the various managers into the goals of the firm. Rice (1966) and Lee (1971) , in the specific case of hospitals, and Baumol (1959) and Williamson (1973) , for firms in general, are representative of these two types of models. These models generally follow the same structure as traditional economic models, but for profit they substitute total output or a proxy for quality, such as total number of inputs or proportion of labor inputs. Quantity maximization is frequently used as a goal for models of hospitals that involve financing. The result of having this as a goal is typically that the hospital acquires financing for as many projects as possible with no concern for the specific purpose of the project involved other than the production of more output. The characterization of the hospital is limited to the quantity it produces, which is determined by the amount of financing it is able to secure.
Quality maximization is used less often in models that include financing, perhaps because of the difficulty involved with defining quality. While output ordered on the basis of the quantity of labor or capital used, or the labor-capital ratio, can be used as an indicator of quality, financing models have not offered these interpretations.
A third type of model maximizes the joint objective of quantity and quality. This is the type of model used by Newhouse (1970) and Feldstein (1971) to describe, respectively, the price-cost structure of hospitals and hospital price inflation. The joint objective allows Feldstein (1971) to trace much of the increase in costs and prices of hospital inputs from the demand for the increasingly higher quality of care provided by hospitals. While the methodology employed in these models is not generally found in financing models, the predictions regarding hospital costs and prices are often cited and used as a basis for comparison.
The standard objective of profit maximization has been applied to hospitals by Davis (1972) . While maximizing quality may be the &dquo;true&dquo; objective of the hospital, maximizing net cash flows can be considered an intermediate step.to maximizing quality. These cash flows can be used to purchase new equipment or better facilities, thus satisfying the final objective. As will be mentioned in a later section, this objective has also been used to explain the more recent issue of &dquo;cost shifting,&dquo; which stems from hospitals' discretion in accounting and pricing practices and in their use of profits. Danzon (1982) and Dittman and Morey (1981) have developed models, also based on profit maximization, to explain the presence of cross-subsidization of services within hospitals. Harris (1979) (Harris 1979 Long (1976 Long ( , 1982a , Conrad (1984) , and Silvers and Kauer (1986) (Conrad 1984, 44) . Consequently, to ensure that capital will be supplied in the future, the nonprofit hospital must provide returns to the equity capital suppliers. To provide the required returns, profits are used during the time period in which they are generated to produce these community dividends (social and public goods); thus, current-period profits on private goods are used to subsidize public goods. Long (1982a,b) Sloan, Hassan, et al. (1988) note that increasing profits may come at the expense of providing additional services. Although it may be efficient to retain some earnings to decrease the costs of new fund-raising, Silvers and Kauer (1986) question the appropriateness of retained earnings. Retaining earnings eliminates the opportunity for donors to receive a tax subsidy on new contributions. Pauly (1986) believes that the opportunity cost of forced contributions from paying customers is higher than the return on a market portfolio of assets. It is, therefore, inappropriate for NFPs to retain earnings, especially when voluntarily donated capital is cheap. In a later work (Pauly 1987b) , he does state that the exact relationship between returns and donations is an unresolved empirical issue. In contrast to these authors, Long (1976) argues that accounting profits (retained earnings) must be positive to ensure a return of capital. If no earnings are retained, the NFP hospital will be unable to continue providing services in the future; it will also be unable to provide the return on equity (social goods) required by equity suppliers. (James 1983; Posnett and Sandler 1986) or if social goods are community dividends (Long 1976 (Long , 1982a (Conrad 1984) and tax benefits (Silvers and Kauer 1986 ). Or, is there an additional perceived benefit that allows NFP hospitals to return less in dollar terms (Posnett and Sandler 1986; Long 1982a,b) (Myers 1977) . Suboptimal investment may also occur when debt is issued against currently held assets (Bodie and Taggart 1978) . New investments may not be made because some of the benefit partially accrues to bondholders in the form of a reduced default probability.
The conflict between bondholders and stockholders is particularly relevant to equity holders of nonprofit firms, because these equity holders are not motivated by monetary wealth maximization. If they value output of public goods, equity holders of the nonprofit firm will be especially prone to invest in projects that are risky for bondholders or to underinvest in positive NPV- (Baker 1985) .
Through restricting the firm from activities that it would otherwise undertake, covenants can have an effect on firm behavior and performance. From the standpoint of the firm, covenants involve writing, monitoring, bonding, and enforcement costs, but may raise the price of the issue (decrease interest expenses) enough to cover costs (Kidwell, Sorensen, Wachowicz 1987) .
The classic reference on bond covenants is Smith and Warners (1979) description and analysis of the many problems of bondholder-stockholder conflict and the ways in which covenants are used as one mechanism to reduce this conflict. In particular, the study examines the covenants written to control four sources of conflict between bondholders and share- Roberts and Viscione (1984) report that use of restrictive covenants increases bond prices (decreases interest expenses). Malitz (1986) Allen, Lamy, and Thompson (1987) , Stultz and Johnson (1985) , and Thatcher (1985) show how certain characteristics of debt instruments can resolve bondholder-shareholder conflicts. Wilson, Sheps, and Oliver (1982) argue that issuing debt increases the cost of care for reimbursers. However, they have been roundly criticized for ignoring the opportunity costs of equity (Foster 1983 (Wedig, Sloan, Hassan, et al. 1988) or lack of reimbursement for equity costs (Conrad 1984 Although Long (1976) , Conrad (1984) , Silvers and Kauer (1986) , and Pauly (1986) 
